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A B S T R A C T
While the potential adverse eﬀects of fossil fuel subsidy reform are well documented for households, the
literature has largely ignored the eﬀect of subsidy reform on ﬁrms’ competitiveness. This paper discusses how
ﬁrms are aﬀected by, and respond to, energy price increases caused by subsidy reforms. It highlights that cost
increases (both direct and indirect) do not necessarily reﬂect competitiveness losses, since ﬁrms have various
ways to mitigate and pass on price shocks. This paper presents and discusses direct and indirect transmission
channels for price shocks, and ﬁrms’ response measures: absorbing cost shocks into proﬁts, inter-fuel
substitution, increasing energy and material eﬃciency, and passing on price increases. It argues that further
micro-econometric studies using enterprise surveys are essential for quantifying the role of these mechanisms,
and for designing policy measures that ensure that competitiveness losses due to subsidy reforms are
minimised.
1. Introduction
In early 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced a signiﬁcant
reduction in fossil fuel subsidies (FFS) as a way to compensate
shrinking government revenues – and the associated ﬁscal pressures
– due to lower oil prices. As subsidies were removed across a range of
fuel types, the subsequent price hikes hit consumers and industries to
varying degrees. Gasoline prices increased by about 50%, mainly
aﬀecting motorists (MEES, 2016). A 67% increase in natural gas prices
principally aﬀected electricity generators and industrial sectors. One of
the highest price increases (133%) was for ethane – a key input for the
petro-chemical sector.
Soon after, some of the largest petro-chemical ﬁrms published
estimates for the likely impacts on their production costs or proﬁts
(MEES, 2016). Several of these ﬁrms estimated the adverse impact on
proﬁts ranging from 6.5% to 44.1% relative to 2014. The Saudi Cement
Company expected production costs to increase by $18.1 m as a direct
consequence of FFS removal (Trade Arabia, 2015). While these self-
reported ﬁgures may not be consistently comparable, they highlight a
common political economy challenge of FFS removal: ﬁrms – and in
particular energy intensive industries – tend to oppose FFS removal
and exert their political clout to do so. Indeed, concerns about
competitiveness and proﬁtability have been a key argument of political
opponents of FFS reform.
However, focussing on energy cost increases alone yields an
incomplete picture of the eﬀects of FFS reform on the competitiveness
of ﬁrms – both direct and indirect transmission channels for energy
prices must be considered, as well as ﬁrms’ ability to respond. The
ability to respond depends on various mechanisms used by ﬁrms to
mitigate (or pass on) price shocks – and thus is crucial for estimating
the net impacts on ﬁrms’ competitiveness.
While the adverse eﬀects of FFS removal are increasingly well
understood for households, the existing literature has largely ignored
the eﬀect of subsidy reform on ﬁrms. This gap in the evidence base
must be addressed in order to enable policy makers to design and
implement FFS reforms more eﬀectively.
This article outlines the most important transmission channels for
energy price shocks, and response measures used by ﬁrms. In doing so,
this article provides (i) a systematic conceptual framework for disen-
tangling the eﬀects of FFS reform and ﬁrms’ response measures, (ii)
guidance for future research by oﬀering an overview of the main
empirical methodologies for analysing these eﬀects, and (iii) a discus-
sion of key policy implications.
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2. Background
A comprehensive body of literature documents the economic,
social, and environmental costs of FFS, and argues that by removing
FFS these costs could be avoided (Coady et al., 2015; Arze del Granado
et al., 2012; IEA, 2014; Rentschler and Bazilian, 2016). The political
economy challenges of subsidy reform are increasingly well understood
as case studies of past reforms are studied and lessons learnt
(Commander, 2012; Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2015; Kojima, 2016;
Strand, 2013).
A crucial factor in determining political economy challenges and
public opposition to reforms are the potentially substantial adverse
eﬀects on livelihoods due to rising energy prices. Studies have shown
how compensation schemes can protect vulnerable households from
energy price shocks associated with FFS reform – and how this can
increase public acceptance of subsidy reform (Arze del Granado et al.,
2012; Rentschler, 2016; Ruggeri Laderchi et al., 2013).
However, with a strong focus on households, research has given far
less attention to the potential impacts of FFS reform on ﬁrms. This is
true despite concerns about competitiveness and proﬁtability, which
have been an important argument of political opponents of subsidy
reform (Hayer, 2017; IMF, 2016a, 2016b). Particularly, energy in-
tensive manufacturing ﬁrms have been argued to experience substan-
tial changes to their cost structures, with adverse implications for
proﬁtability (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012). Evidently such eﬀects can
have knock-on eﬀects on economic activity, employment, and thus on
households (Kilian, 2008).
Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Vietnam,
Willenbockel and Hoa (2011) suggest that ﬁrms can cope with
moderate energy price increases (5–10% per year) using common
energy eﬃciency measures. In Egypt, a doubling of energy prices due to
subsidy removal is estimated to reduce proﬁt margins of ﬁrms in
energy intensive sectors, e.g. in the cement (29–39% reduction),
fertiliser (22%), and steel sectors (13%) (Khattab, 2007). Jamal and
Ayarkwa (2014) provide evidence from Ghana suggesting that ﬁrms are
strongly aﬀected by the indirect eﬀects of subsidy reform, as the costs
of transportation and raw materials increase, while consumers’ pur-
chasing power decreases. Tambunan (2015) makes the same observa-
tion using data on Indonesian small enterprises, and emphasises that
the ultimate eﬀect of subsidy removal depends crucially on ﬁrms’
ability to mitigate price shocks – which in turn can be strengthened by
dedicated policy measures.
Studies on the impact of environmental taxes on ﬁrms also oﬀer
relevant insights. In a comprehensive literature review, Dechezlepretre
and Sato (2014) assess the empirical evidence on the eﬀect of
environmental taxes on competitiveness, for a wide range of industries
and countries. They conclude that – unlike market conditions and skills
– environmental taxes (and regulation more generally) do not have a
large adverse eﬀect on ﬁrm or country-level indicators of competitive-
ness. In an empirical study on Germany, Flues and Lutz (2015) show
that electricity taxes (EUR 20.5/MWh, or 32–68%) did not negatively
aﬀect common competitiveness indicators of ﬁrms, such as turnover,
exports, value added, investment, and employment. In a review of
earlier literature, Zhang and Baranzini (2004) also conclude that
overall, the competitiveness losses due to carbon taxes are small and
in many cases insigniﬁcant.
Arlinghaus (2015) reviews the empirical literature on the eﬀects of
carbon taxes on various indicators of competitiveness. The author
concludes that studies consistently fail to identify any signiﬁcant
adverse competitiveness eﬀect from the introduction of carbon taxes.
This observation holds across various indicators of competitiveness,
including employment, output, proﬁts, and exports. Several other
studies also conclude that stricter environmental policies have little
adverse eﬀect on competitiveness; and – in line with the Porter
Hypothesis – ﬁnd that some ﬁrms may even be able to increase their
productivity (Albrizio et al., 2014; Ekins and Speck, 2010; Enevoldsen
et al., 2009; Porter, 1990).
Reviewing the empirical literature on the determinants of competi-
tiveness, Dethier et al. (2011) ﬁnd that other factors such as infra-
structure, ﬁnance, security, competition, and administrative capacity
play a far more signiﬁcant role than energy prices in determining ﬁrms’
performance. A key reason is that energy costs tend to constitute a
relatively small share of total production costs – e.g. typically 5% or
lower in EU manufacturing sectors (Bergmann et al., 2007; Ro, 2013;
Wilting and Hanemaaijer, 2014).
Conceptually, energy price increases due to FFS removal are
directly comparable to energy price increases due to carbon or energy
taxes. However, it should be noted that price increases due to subsidy
removal can be particularly large: While depending on fuel-speciﬁc
subsidisation rates, subsidy reforms have caused energy price increases
of 100% and more in the past (Fattouh et al., 2016; Rentschler and
Bazilian, 2016). This emphasises that case-speciﬁc analyses of FFS
reforms are crucial.
3. Transmission channels and response measures
In the case of households, the literature on FFS reforms typically
distinguishes direct and indirect price eﬀects; i.e., the extent to which
energy price changes directly aﬀect households by increasing the cost
of energy consumption, and indirectly by increasing the cost of other
goods and services. In the case of ﬁrms these two transmission
channels also apply. In addition to these transmission channels, several
response measures play a crucial role in determining the net eﬀect of
subsidy removal on ﬁrms.
This section discusses the transmission channels for energy price
shocks, and presents four common response measures (Fig. 1). As we
discuss, empirical analyses of enterprise surveys can help to shed light
on these aspects, and identify diﬀerences across sectors and regions. In
the case of larger, publicly listed ﬁrms similar analyses can be
conducted using balance sheets and accounts; this is of particular
relevance when an economy or sector is dominated by few large ﬁrms
which are in a strong political position to oppose reforms.
3.1. Transmission channels of energy price increases
1) Direct channel
Fig. 1. Energy price shocks due to subsidy removal: Channels for shock transmission and response measures.
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Removing subsidies on speciﬁc energy types will increase the
energy input costs of ﬁrms. As subsidy removal aﬀects energy prices
“instantly”, directly transmitted price shocks are typically the ﬁrst
impact felt by ﬁrms. This means that direct price shocks aﬀect ﬁrms’
energy costs almost instantaneously, unless the price of energy
inputs has been hedged. Such immediate cost shocks cannot
typically be coped with using structural measures (such as techno-
logical updates to increase energy eﬃciency), but require quickly
deployable measures. In practice, energy-intensive industries, such
as petrochemicals, cement, steel, manufacturing, or transport tend
to be particularly exposed to the direct price shocks induced by
subsidy reform. The potential eﬀect of such energy price shocks on
competitiveness has been a central concern of governments con-
sidering FFS reform (IMF, 2016a, 2016b).
The level of ﬁrms’ exposure to direct energy price shocks
depends on their energy intensity, which varies signiﬁcantly across
industries, and only changes slowly in line with innovation and
technological progress (Worrell et al., 2008). Thus, in order to
mitigate direct price shocks due to FFS reform, policy makers
cannot easily reduce ﬁrms’ exposure, but are instead required to
moderate the price shock itself. For this purpose, measures to
smoothen price shocks – e.g. through step-wise reduction of FFS,
price stabilisation funds, or alignment with low international energy
prices – have played a key role in reducing direct energy price
shocks, and associated adverse eﬀects on households and ﬁrms
(Coady et al., 2012; Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017).
Quantitatively, a ﬁrm's exposure to direct energy price shocks
can be approximated as the ratio between energy input costs and
total input costs or revenues.1 However, note that energy expendi-
ture reported in ﬁrm surveys does not necessarily increase at the
same rate as energy prices, as they may include various payments to
energy suppliers that do not directly depend on energy prices (e.g.
suppliers’ labour costs, electricity transmission costs, or service fees
(Grave et al., 2015; Marcu et al., 2014)). Moreover, it is important
to distinguish between diﬀerent types of energy inputs, as energy
types are typically subsidised at diﬀerent rates (and some not at all).
Studies on household-level eﬀects oﬀer empirical methodologies
for simulating direct price shocks (i.e. partial equilibrium eﬀects)
associated with FFS reform as described by Coady (2006). Both the
IMF (2016a) and Araar and Verme (2012) oﬀer econometric
models to assess the impact of FFS removal on household con-
sumption and welfare using household expenditure surveys.
Essentially, these models simulate the cost shock due to an energy
price increase, and use elasticities to estimate changes in consump-
tion bundles. These models can be adapted to the case of ﬁrms, by
using enterprise surveys to consider the direct eﬀect of price
changes on proﬁts, revenues, or other outcome variables.
2) Indirect channel
Energy prices also aﬀect ﬁrms indirectly, via the production costs of
intermediate inputs and capital equipment. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms
producing intermediate goods will incur direct energy price shocks,
which they (at least partially) pass on to other ﬁrms by increasing the
price of intermediate inputs (Castagneto-Gissey, 2014; Kim et al.,
2010; Sijm et al., 2006). In this way energy price shocks can progress
through supply chains in the form of price increases of non-energy
goods. In practice, ﬁrms relying heavily on energy intensive inter-
mediate inputs (e.g. materials with high embodied energy content, such
as steel) tend to be aﬀected most by indirect price shocks (Bassi et al.,
2009). Moreover, wage costs may increase as higher energy costs drive
consumer price inﬂation.
Indirect price eﬀects are likely to take longer to fully materialise, as
price shocks are successively passed down supply chains. How quickly
any given ﬁrm will incur the full indirect price shock depends not least
on the number and interlinkages of preceding intermediate production
stages. Thus, the magnitude and timing of indirect price shocks
depends to a large extent on the response measures taken by
intermediary ﬁrms (including their pass-on rate).
Besides the change in intermediate (non-energy) input costs,
another potential indirect shock should be acknowledged: An increase
in energy prices will (ceteris paribus) reduce the disposable income of
consumers, thus potentially reducing aggregate demand (Jamal and
Ayarkwa, 2014). This demand shock in turn is likely to aﬀect ﬁrms’
output and revenue levels. The magnitude of this eﬀect will depend
crucially on how FFS reform revenues are re-used (e.g. compensation
of consumers, or government expenditure).
In a study on household consumption, Arze del Granado et al.
(2012) suggest that on average indirect eﬀects make up about 60% of
the total impacts of a subsidy removal. Also in the context of ﬁrms it is
likely that indirectly transmitted price shocks equal or exceed direct
ones (Jamal and Ayarkwa, 2014). The reason is that energy input costs
typically constitute a far smaller share of overall costs than non-energy
inputs (Allwood et al., 2011; Flachenecker et al., 2016; Wilting and
Hanemaaijer, 2014). Thus, it is crucial for policy makers not to
underestimate potential price shocks by focusing solely on direct price
eﬀects. Since all indirect price shocks originate as direct shocks
upstream in value chains, the policy measures for moderating direct
energy price shocks – e.g. gradual FFS reduction, or price stabilisation
funds – are also critical in the context of the indirect price channel.
The level of a ﬁrm's exposure to indirect energy price shocks
depends above all on the energy intensity of its intermediate produc-
tion inputs. Enterprise surveys provide detailed accounts of ﬁrms’
expenditure on materials, and various databases exist which oﬀer
detailed estimates of the embodied energy of hundreds of the most
common industrial materials (Hammond and Jones, 2011). Based on
this data, the level of exposure can be approximated by determining the
“embodied” energy content of a ﬁrm's production inputs. However, the
geographical origin of materials is crucial to consider, as domestic
energy price shocks due to FFS removal are irrelevant for imported
materials – no matter their energy intensity.
The econometric simulation models by the IMF (2016a) and Araar
and Verme (2012) also enable the integration of input-output tables. In
this way energy price shocks can be simulated, not only for a ﬁrm's
direct energy inputs, but also for the embodied energy component of all
intermediate inputs and materials, and taking into account complex
value chains. However, to take full general equilibrium eﬀects of FFS
reform into account – e.g. with respect to sectoral reallocation of
resources – CGE models with detailed sectoral disaggregation are
necessary (Durand-Lasserve et al., 2015; Hosoe et al., 2010; Siddig
et al., 2014).
3.2. Four response measures
The transmission channels discussed above determine the size of
the overall cost shock faced by a ﬁrm following a subsidy reform. This
section discusses the four most important response measures that
ﬁrms typically use to respond to the overall cost shock. Three of these –
absorption, substitution, and resource eﬃciency – refer to internal
responses within ﬁrms; the last response measure – pass-on – can help
ﬁrms to forward remaining cost shocks to other ﬁrms or households.
Only by assessing both the combined cost shock and ﬁrms’ capacity to
implement response measures, can the net eﬀect of FFS reform on
competitiveness be understood.
a) Absorption
If proﬁt margins are large, ﬁrms can (temporarily) absorb
energy price shocks by accepting smaller margins. If energy price
shocks are fully absorbed into proﬁt margins, ﬁrms can continue
1 For instance, for industrial enterprises in Ireland energy costs are estimated to be up
to 6% of total direct costs (Fergal O′Leary et al., 2007).
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operations without making adjustments to technology and produc-
tion quantities, or sales prices. In this case, consumption of both the
(formerly) subsidised fuel and of all other energy inputs can remain
constant. Absorbing price shocks into proﬁts is a ﬁrm's direct
analogy to a household absorbing shocks into savings (though note
the diﬀerence between the stock and ﬂow of savings).
Since more structural responses (e.g. fuel substitution, or
increasing energy eﬃciency) require time and investment, the
ability to absorb immediate cost increases into proﬁts can be a
crucial short-term transition measure. However, in the medium- to
long-term reduced proﬁt margins will result in wider welfare losses;
for instance because wages in small enterprises typically depend on
proﬁts, or because it reduces capital reserves for productive
investments.
For policy makers it is essential to understand ﬁrms’ ability to
cope in the immediate aftermath of a FFS reform – not least to
ensure public acceptance of reform. If proﬁt margins are small,
ﬁrms are likely to struggle to absorb cost increases, thus requiring
policy makers to provide active support measures to mitigate and
compensate shocks in the short-term, and facilitate the transition
by facilitating more structural response measures in the medium- to
long-term (such as supporting substitution and eﬃciency measures,
Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017). In the above referenced example of
Saudi Arabia, the 14 largest petro-chemical ﬁrms had jointly made
total net proﬁts of over $9bn in 2014 (MEES, 2016). It is plausible
that high proﬁts reaﬃrmed policy makers that energy price
increases would enable these ﬁrms to absorb cost increases in the
short-run, and invest in substitution and eﬃciency in the medium-
to long-run.
The ability of ﬁrms to absorb energy price shocks can be
approximated by comparing absolute net proﬁts with the overall
energy price shock. Since direct price eﬀects dominate in the short-
term (Araar and Verme, 2012), computing the ratio of proﬁts and
energy expenditures can also provide an indication of the short-
term ability to absorb energy price shocks. The ability of ﬁrms to
absorb indirect eﬀects, can be understood by comparing the ratio of
proﬁts and expenditure on energy-intensive intermediate inputs. If
proﬁt margins signiﬁcantly exceed the estimated energy cost shock,
ﬁrms are likely to be able to rely on absorption as a short-term
response measure.
In addition to the above indicators, ﬁrm surveys – speciﬁcally
panels, or cross-sections with pronounced regional heterogeneity –
also enable empirical analyses on the role and relevance of
absorption. For instance, econometric methods can uncover
whether proﬁt margins are aﬀected by price changes of diﬀerent
energy types (Smale et al., 2006).
b) Substitution
As subsidy reforms typically increase the price of selected
energy types (e.g. electricity, petrol), ﬁrms may also respond by
substituting these energy types with fuels that have become
relatively cheaper (Chang, 1994; Koetse et al., 2008; Stern, 2012).
Such inter-fuel substitution can be observed in the form of changing
energy shares (i.e. the energy mix) in total energy usage as a
response to energy price changes.
The ability to substitute energy types is constrained by techno-
logical characteristics of production, which can vary signiﬁcantly
across sectors (Ma et al., 2008). In fact, technological innovation
and substitution may play a key role in determining how a green tax
reform (e.g. FFS reform) aﬀects competitiveness (Koskela et al.,
2001). In addition, inter-fuel substitution depends critically on the
access to alternative energy types and reliability of supply, which
can vary across regions. For instance, lacking access to the
electricity grid or frequent power outages may mean that rural
ﬁrms are unable to rely on electricity as a substitute for fuels that
are subject to FFS reform.
From a welfare perspective, substitution can be a desirable
response measure if unsustainable fuels are replaced by cleaner or
renewable alternatives. For policy makers this means that targeted
measures for supporting alternative energies can be crucial – not
only to help ﬁrms to use substitution as a coping measure, but also
to guide the direction of substitution. Such support measures can
include the provision of technology, or temporary subsidisation of
alternative energies (e.g. renewables) (Matsuo and Schmidt, 2017).
For instance, the government of Indonesia complemented their
2007 kerosene FFS reform with active support measures to natural
gas (speciﬁcally, the provision of gas cook stoves) in order to
prevent substitution towards other unsustainable fuels (such as
charcoal or ﬁrewood; GSI, 2011; IMF 2013a, 2013b). For similar
reasons, Kenya complemented their 2005 FFS reform with large-
scale investments in rural electriﬁcation, thus enabling users to
switch away from fossil fuels (IMF, 2013a, 2013b).
Data on energy access (e.g. rural electriﬁcation rates) can
provide insights on potential inter-fuel substitution opportunities
and constraints. Firm surveys also frequently collect information on
energy access and supply quality, which can shed light on ﬁrms’
ability to substitute across regions and sectors (Arnold et al., 2008).
Moreover, the nature and magnitude of inter-fuel substitutability
can be formally characterised and estimated on the basis of ﬁrm
surveys, e.g. by estimating own and cross price elasticities, or
partial elasticities of substitution – for details see Azlina et al.
(2013), Bjørner and Jensen (2002), Blackorby and Russell (1989),
Pindyck (1979), and Uzawa (1962).
c) Resource eﬃciency2
Firms may also respond to direct energy cost increases by
increasing energy eﬃciency, i.e. reducing overall energy consump-
tion while maintaining pre-reform output levels. Moreover, increas-
ing material eﬃciency can play a crucial role in responding to
indirectly transmitted price shocks, which are due to embodied
energy in intermediate materials (Flachenecker et al., 2016). In fact,
considering that material costs often signiﬁcantly exceed energy
costs even in energy intensive manufacturing sectors, the role of
material eﬃciency is of particular importance (Allwood et al., 2011;
Wilting and Hanemaaijer, 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2005).
Formally, energy (or material) eﬃciency relates to the marginal
product of energy (or material inputs), i.e. the output obtainable
from the last unit of energy input given the current production
technology. This implies that gains in resource eﬃciency require an
adjustment to the production function, for instance by updating
production processes or technology. Thus, from a policy making
perspective, improvements in resource eﬃciency are a desirable
and welfare improving response to FFS reforms, as they are
associated with modernisation, innovation, and reduction of nega-
tive externalities of ineﬃcient energy usage (such as air pollution
(Flachenecker et al., 2016)).
Similar to the case of substitution, the ability of ﬁrms to increase
resource eﬃciency depends on a variety of factors, all of which
mandate dedicated policy measures: e.g. to improve the availability
and aﬀordability of modern technology, and to provide support
programmes for identifying, ﬁnancing, and implementing eﬃciency
enhancing measures (Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017; Rohdin et al.,
2007; Trianni et al., 2013).
Single factor productivity measures can enable the approxima-
tion and benchmarking of energy or material eﬃciency at the
national or sector level, hence allowing an estimate of the need and
scope for eﬃciency improvements (Bringezu and Schütz, 2010;
Dahlström and Ekins, 2005). In addition, the use of enterprise
surveys can enable the estimation of resource eﬃciency levels with
high sectoral and regional granularity (by computing the quantity of
output per unit of energy or material input). Moreover, regression
2 “Resources” comprise both energy and materials.
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analyses of ﬁrm surveys can reveal empirically whether (and to
what extent) resource eﬃciency levels have depended on energy
prices in the past. If this link is weak, dedicated policy measures
may be required to incentivise and enable ﬁrms to use eﬃciency
improvements as a response to energy price increases (Rentschler
et al., 2016).
d) Pass-on
The net impact of FFS reform on ﬁrms also depends on whether
price shocks are passed-on to end-users. Essentially, this channel refers
to the extent to which ﬁrms can adjust the unit sales price of output in
response to changing input costs (without incurring excessive reduc-
tions of sales quantities).
Technically, a ﬁrm's ability to adjust its sales price depends on the
consumer's demand choices, or more speciﬁcally the price elasticity of
demand; i.e. the rate at which end-users (e.g. households) and other
ﬁrms (consumers of intermediate goods) substitute away from a given
ﬁrm's product following a price change. This in turn can depend on a
variety of factors: the degree of competition, and the availability and
aﬀordability of alternatives (Kim et al., 2010; Sijm et al., 2006).
Reviewing the empirical evidence on the pass-on of carbon taxes,
Arlinghaus (2015) concludes that across industries pass-on rates vary
between 0% and over 100% of the price shock – thus highlighting the
important role of sector speciﬁc conditions.
Formally, the pass-on rate can be measured as the change in a
good's unit sales price in response to energy price changes (Sijm et al.,
2006). Firm surveys typically oﬀer information on ﬁrm speciﬁc input
and output prices, and – in particular panel data – can be used to
estimate pass-on rates. For policy making purposes it is important to
empirically estimate to what extent ﬁrms have in the past passed on
energy price increases to consumers. This determines whether fuel
price shocks due to FFS reform are simply passed on to consumers,
thus causing inﬂationary pressures – i.e. whether additional measures
are needed to achieve objectives such as modernisation, eﬃciency
improvements, and reduction of fossil fuel usage and associated
negative externalities.
4. Conclusion and policy implications
4.1. Need for further research
By building the evidence base on FFS reforms and ﬁrms, research
can strengthen the design of FFS reforms and increase the momentum
for reforms. Country-level studies for major subsidising economies are
needed to estimate the likely eﬀects of FFS reform on ﬁrms. CGE
models can estimate eﬀects at the sector level, and provide insights
about interactions between sectors, dynamic eﬀects, and both direct
and indirect price shocks. Firm survey analyses can also shed light on
both direct and indirect price eﬀects, if combined with input-output
tables.3 Moreover, ﬁrm survey analyses can be critical for gaining a
more granular understanding of how FFS reforms may aﬀect certain
types of ﬁrms, and how these may respond.
Micro-level approaches using household surveys have oﬀered
crucial insights into how energy shocks due to fossil fuel subsidy
reforms can aﬀect the livelihoods of households (Coady et al., 2012;
Rentschler and Bazilian, 2016; Verme and El-Massnaoui, 2015).
Similarly, there is a clear need for empirical studies using micro-level
ﬁrm data, which investigate exposure and vulnerability to energy price
shocks (Dethier et al., 2011).
However, it is important not to equate cost increases with competi-
tiveness losses. Empirical analyses using ﬁrm-level data can also be
crucial for investigating the ability of ﬁrms to use response measures
(i.e. absorption, substitution, eﬃciency, and pass-on), which determine
to what extent cost increases do in fact translate into competitiveness
losses. Thus, e.g. by computing elasticities empirical studies can
provide detailed case-speciﬁc insights to inform the design of policy
measures for strengthening coping and adjustment capacities.
Research should also focus on how energy price increases may aﬀect
other ﬁrm level outcomes – employment in particular – in order to
determine to what extent adverse eﬀects of FFS reforms are passed on
to households, and how they can be protected.
As policy measures are identiﬁed to mitigate the adverse eﬀects on
competitiveness, research is also needed on how such mitigation
measures can be integrated into broader eﬀorts to strengthen the
business environment in which ﬁrms operate. Enterprise surveys, such
as the Doing Business reports by the World Bank (2016), the
Management, Organisation and Innovation surveys by the EBRD
(2010), or the Competitiveness reports by the World Economic
Forum (2016) provide useful starting points to explore the drivers of
and barriers to competitiveness. Such research may demonstrate that
FFS reforms should not only be associated competitiveness losses, but
– in line with the Porter Hypothesis – may promote eﬃciency,
innovation, modernisation, and thus increase competitiveness.
4.2. Policy implications
As case studies of past reforms are studied and lessons learnt, the
political economy challenges of subsidy reform are increasingly well
documented (Commander, 2012; Strand, 2013). Concerns about
competitiveness and proﬁtability have been a key part of these
challenges, and key arguments of political opponents of subsidy
reform. Particularly, energy intensive manufacturing ﬁrms have been
argued to experience substantial changes to their cost structures, with
adverse implications for proﬁtability (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012).
Evidently such eﬀects can have knock-on eﬀects on jobs and thus on
households.
Countless studies have rightly emphasised the need for social
protection measures to protect vulnerable households, and thus to
manage political economy challenges. In addition, this article argues,
policy makers must also consider actions for strengthening the ability
of ﬁrms to respond to energy price shocks. In particular:
• Mitigate short-term losses: This is crucial for ensuring business
continuity, and allowing time to ﬁrms to implement more structural
measures (including eﬃciency measures). In some cases, policy
makers may decide that no major short-term assistance is required,
as proﬁt margins are large enough to absorb cost shocks and ﬁnance
investments in eﬃciency and substitution. However, especially in
competitive markets proﬁt margins cannot always be assumed to be
large, thus requiring policy makers to consider measures to mitigate
potential competitiveness losses.
• Enable substitution and eﬃciency measures: Measures may
be needed to help ﬁrms substitute towards alternative fuel types or
to increase the eﬃciency of energy and material usage. In particular,
policy makers must identify and address barriers (such as informa-
tion, capacity, and ﬁnancial constraints) that prevent ﬁrms from
investing in eﬃciency enhancing measures; e.g. by providing
technical assistance, information programmes, and ﬁnancial support
for technological modernisation (Rentschler et al., 2016). In addi-
tion, providing reliable and aﬀordable access to alternative energies
(e.g. through public investments in electriﬁcation, and renewable
energy) can be critical for facilitating and directing inter-fuel
substitution.
Finally, it should be recalled that energy costs are only one
(minor) factor among many that determine a ﬁrm's or sector's
competitiveness (Dethier et al., 2011; WEF, 2016). These factors
oﬀer alternative entry points for policy makers to counter-balance
potential competitiveness losses due to energy price increases; for
3 See Araar and Verme (2012) for a discussion on how input-output tables can be used
in the context of household surveys.
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instance by strengthening institutions and administrative capacity,
or by investing in infrastructure and labour productivity, and
ensuring a stable business environment through prudent long-term
policy strategies (World Bank, 2017).
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